In Gorgias, Socrates makes the case that while it may seem someone would prefer getting away with injustice, it is actually better on an individual level to be punished and to pay what is due:

1. One who disciplines correctly disciplines justly (476e).
2. If someone is being disciplined justly, then he is being acted upon justly (476e).
3. If something is just, then it is also admirable (476e).
4. (2,3) If someone is being justly disciplined, the one who disciplines does admirable things and one who is being disciplined has admirable things done to him (476e).
5. Ιf something is admirable, then it is either pleasant or beneficial (477a).
6. If someone has something beneficial done to him, then he is being benefited (477a).
7. If someone is benefitted, then his life undergoes improvement (477a).
8. (4-7) If someone is justly disciplined, then his life undergoes improvement (477a).
9. If someone's life improves after paying what is due by being justly disciplined, then he has gotten rid of something, namely injustice, that was corrupting his life (477a).
10. The happiest man has no bad in his life, and the second happiest man is the one who gets rid of injustice in his life (478d).
11. The man who keeps injustice in his life and who doesn't get rid of it is the one whose life is the worst (478e). C. So, someone's life would be better if he is justly disciplined than if he hadn't paid what's due.

However, the first issue with this argument arises with its validity. Socrates fails to establish one key premise, which would fit between premise five and six: Discipline is not pleasant. From this, Socrates could assert that if just discipline is admirable, but not pleasant, then it must be beneficial, which would lead him into his sixth premise. Without it, Socrates fails to acknowledge that discipline is not pleasant and therefore only beneficial. While the concept of discipline or punishment as pleasurable seems a bit paradoxical, this premise is necessary to make the argument flow logically. So, with this added premise, the argument would be constructed as such:

1. One who disciplines correctly disciplines justly.
2. If someone is being disciplined justly then he is being acted upon justly.
3. If something is just, then it is also admirable.
4. (2,3) If someone is being justly disciplined, the one who disciplines does admirable things and one who is being disciplined has admirable things done to him.
5. Ιf something is admirable, then it is either pleasant or beneficial.
6. Discipline is not pleasant.
7. (5,6) If just discipline is admirable, but not pleasant, then it must be beneficial.
8. If someone has something beneficial done to him, then he is being benefited.
9. If someone is benefitted, then his life undergoes improvement.
10. (7,8,9) If someone is justly disciplined, then his life undergoes improvement.
11. If someone's life improves after paying what is due by being justly disciplined, then he has gotten rid of something, namely injustice, that was corrupting his life.
12. The happiest man has no bad in his life, and the second happiest man is the one who gets rid of injustice in his life.
13. The man who keeps injustice in his life and who doesn't get rid of it is the one whose life is the worst. C. So, someone's life would be better if he is justly disciplined than if he hadn't paid what is due.

While this reconstruction is valid, it fails to be perfectly convincing because of several key points. First, Socrates does not consider that perhaps not all injustices make the supposed wrongdoers life worse. This poses a challenge to premise eleven. If the injustice never did any harm in the first place, it seems implausible that discipline would somehow improve the life of whoever committed it. For example, if a man's family was starving, and he stole bread from a very wealthy corporation with thousands of chains, does this injustice truly make the man's life worse? Does the injustice of stealing actually weigh on the man's conscience and act as a corruptive factor. Socrates would likely respond that in such a case, the action was not an injustice at all; yet, in a criminal court, the man would still be prosecuted for theft. Perhaps Socrates would then respond saying that in such a case, the man is not being justly disciplined, so once again it falls outside of his argument. Even so, there are minimum and maximum sentences for nearly every crime, and there are virtually no exceptions to injustices such as stealing. So, the man will most likely end up being disciplined, and while his punishment may be seen as technically just in a legal landscape, the man would receive no true benefit from this disciplinary action. At the end of his punishment, his family will still be starving, and if he had no moral weight on his actions to begin with, surely being punished couldn't result in a sense of self-improvement. Similarly, take the example of someone who defaces government property as a form of protest; in their mind, their crime was completely just, whereas the government would say just protest would be utilizing the right to vote. Yet, the discipline that ensues wouldn't make the life of the vandal any better, since in their mind, they did no wrong but rather acted in the name of justice. Socrates would argue that they are simply ignorant to their personal corruption, but it seems unreasonable to say that their life would improve if they are punished for something they truly believe was morally correct.

This leads to the second objection, that discipline and punishment, even when done justly, might not always lead to self-improvement. This objection poses a threat to premise ten, since Socrates asserts this is necessarily the case. However, one counterexample to this assertion is the presence of habitual offenders in society. If there are two people, and both steal an orange from a grocery store, they both ought to be punished in the same way since they committed the same crime. Therefore, under Socrates logic, they will both be disciplined correctly and justly. One would figure that, by this line of reasoning, the thieves wouldn't steal again. However, while some people may move past their previous injustice, others will relapse and become habitual offenders despite facing the same punishment. Socrates might argue that the punishments might need to be more personalized and analyze the causes of injustice. However, Socrates also puts forward judges as the administrators of discipline (478a), so it seems impossible for the legal system to be able to dissect and distinguish between an example of a thief who will turn into a habitual offender and one who will never commit such a crime again. So, Socrates' premise that discipline will always lead to improvement is simply implausible, since it has already been proven as such.

Another premise which comes into question is premise five, that admirable things will always be either pleasant or beneficial. Consider the example of an attempted rescue: a man is drowning in a river, so a bystander jumps into action and attempts to rescue him. If both people die in the process, surely the act was neither pleasant, nor beneficial. Death is not pleasant, and was likely painful in this instance. There was no benefit, since not only did the drowning man not survive, but in fact another life was lost in the process. Yet, the bystander's actions were certainly admirable, considering his courage to risk his own life for the sake of a stranger. So, this leaves an undefined section of admirable things that are neither pleasant nor beneficial, which is contrary to Socrates' premise. Socrates might dispute this claim by saying this counterexample indeed falls under benefit, since public displays of courage can inspire virtue into the masses, but this seems like a bit of a stretch. Society's reflection on the event and potential inspiration is not at all guaranteed; the death of two men, however, is.

Premise four also mitigates the persuasiveness of Socrates' argument, since it seems unfeasible that punishment, even if done justly, is synonymous to doing admirable things. While the reasoning behind discipline can be just, it would be far-fetched to say the actual discipline in itself is just. For example, say the just punishment for a certain crime is some sort of public humiliation. The actual act of humiliating someone is in no way admirable, even if there is good reason behind it. Perhaps Socrates would claim this is simply a result of ignorance, and that one ought to admire such actions, like the carrying out of public humiliation, since it requires virtue and is just. However, I think this approach would simply be a circular argument; Socrates claims all just things are admirable, then says that the one who carries out punishment does admirable things, then clarifies why it ought to be admired since it is an example of justice, which brings the argument back to the claim that all just things are admirable. Therefore, just things aren't necessarily admirable, even if their reasoning is.

Finally, premise twelve seems doubtful given its failure to account for the increase of gratitude and awareness that comes with improvement. Socrates says that the man who has never endured any sort of injustice or corruption in his life will be happier even than the man who has totally eliminated it. However, consider two people, one who was raised in a beautiful and pleasurable environment, whereas the other was raised in a desolate and ugly land. If the first man never leaves this place, he would have always lived in an ideal place. However, he will also be unable to conceptualize why his location is preferable to any other since he has no context as to how perfect his world truly is. Nevertheless, if the second man moves away from his undesirable location and into the pleasurable one, it would be reasonable to say he has a greater sense of appreciation than a man who had lived there all his life, which could result in a greater level of happiness. Socrates might say that still, it is preferable to never experience any hardship at all. While indeed, it would be preferable, that does not necessarily equate to a greater level of happiness, which is where the fault lies in Socrates' statement.

In conclusion, Socrates' argument is not valid, and even when the necessary and logical premises are added, it still fails to be convincing.